Recommendations for safer radiotherapy: what’s the message? by Peter Dunscombe
“fonc-02-00129” — 2012/9/27 — 13:09 — page 1 — #1
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 28 September 2012
doi: 10.3389/fonc.2012.00129
Recommendations for safer radiotherapy:
what’s the message?
Peter Dunscombe*
Department of Oncology, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
Edited by:
Edward Sternick, Rhode Island
Hospital, USA
Reviewed by:
Michael Chan,Wake Forest
University, USA
John Suh, Cleveland Clinic
Foundation, USA
*Correspondence:
Peter Dunscombe, Department of
Medical Physics, Tom Baker Cancer
Centre, 1331 29th Street NW,
Calgary, AB, CanadaT2N 4N2.
e-mail: peter.dunscombe@
albertahealthservices.ca
Radiotherapy, with close to a million courses delivered per year in North America, is a
very safe and effective intervention for a devastating disease. However, although rare,
several deeply regrettable incidents have occurred in radiotherapy and have rightly been
the subject of considerable public interest. Partly in response to reports of these inci-
dents a variety of authoritative organizations across the globe has harnessed the expertise
amongst their members in attempts to identify the measures that will make radiotherapy
safer. While the intentions of all these organizations are clearly good it is challenging for
the health care providers in the clinic to know where to start with so much advice coming
from so many directions. Through a mapping exercise we have identiﬁed commonalities
between recommendations made in seven authoritative documents and identiﬁed those
issues most frequently cited.The documents reviewed contain a total of 117 recommenda-
tions. Using the 37 recommendations in “Towards Safer Radiotherapy” as the initial base
layer, recommendations in the other documents were mapped, adding to the base layer
to accommodate all the recommendations from the additional six documents as neces-
sary.This mapping exercise resulted in the distillation of the original 117 recommendations
down to 61 unique recommendations.Twelve topics were identiﬁed in three or more of the
documents as being pertinent to the improvement of patient safety in radiotherapy. They
are, in order of most to least cited: training, stafﬁng, documentation, incident learning,
communication, check lists, quality control and preventive maintenance, dosimetric audit,
accreditation, minimizing interruptions, prospective risk assessment, and safety culture.
This analysis provides guidance for the selection of those activities most likely to enhance
safety and quality in radiotherapy based on the frequency of citation in selected recent
authoritative literature.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years various august bodies have provided
recommendations as to how radiotherapy could be made safer. A
consortium of UK professional and other organizations published
Towards Safer Radiotherapy (Donaldson, 2007); the World Health
Organization published its Radiotherapy Risk Proﬁle (World
Health Organization, 2007), and the International Commission
onRadiological Protection published PreventingAccidental Expo-
sures from New External Beam Radiation Therapy Technologies
(International Commission on Radiological Protection, 2010). In
addition there are the established Hierarchy of Actions (a tool
for facilitating Health Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) from
the US National Centre for Patient Safety (United States Govern-
ment of Veterans Affairs, 2012), ASTRO’s Target Safely initiative
(American Society for Radiation Oncology, 2012a) and, more
recently, the Hendee–Herman (H–H) article (Hendee and Her-
man, 2011) summarizing the recommendations to come out of
the AAPM/ASTRO sponsored Miami meeting of 2010. The much
anticipated report of the AAPM’s TG 100 (Huq et al., 2008; a
comprehensive Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the Inten-
sity Modulated Radiation Therapy Process) is likely to contain
ﬁve Key Core Requirements for quality management (of which
error management/safety is a signiﬁcant component). The crude
sum of the recommendations emanating from these seven sources
is 117.
It is of interest, and of value, to the ﬁeld of safety in
radiotherapy, to look for commonalities between these various
recommendations and hence to identify those initiatives that have
received the most recognition. Such identiﬁcation may guide us,
as professional organizations, radiotherapy providers, and equip-
ment suppliers, toward those initiatives, considered by the experts
in the ﬁeld, most likely to enhance patient safety in radiother-
apy. This communication describes an attempt by the author to
distil these 117 recommendations down to a manageable num-
ber which have received broad endorsement. Twelve initiatives
that are recommended in at least three of the seven documents
referred to above have been identiﬁed. The means by which these
12 were identiﬁed will be described and for each of the twelve a
commentary is provided as a basis for further discussion.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
The seven primary sources of the 117 recommendations listed
above constituted the input to the analysis (Donaldson, 2007;
World Health Organization, 2007; Huq et al., 2008; International
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Commission on Radiological Protection, 2010; Hendee and Her-
man, 2011; American Society for Radiation Oncology, 2012a;
United States Government of Veterans Affairs, 2012).
To identify commonalities requiredmapping each set of recom-
mendations onto a base layer of major topics. There are, of course,
several challenges in doing this. Many of the documents referred to
above combine two ormore recommendations into one numbered
paragraph. An example of this is Recommendation 2 in the H–H
article (Hendee and Herman, 2011) which includes both the state-
ment “Workstations should be clutter-free. . .” and “Therapists
should not be interrupted while treatments are underway.”While
both these recommendations are eminently sensible, the means
by which they will be achieved are different. There are many such
examples throughout the other documents, mainly but not exclu-
sively, where prose is used to elaborate on the recommendations.
On the other hand, however, brevity in the recommendations
can lead to difﬁculty of interpretation. For example, why does
“Staff competency assessment” appear as a recommendation in
the WHO document (World Health Organization, 2007)? Surely
it is a component of “Competency certiﬁcation” which is recom-
mended in the same document. Maybe two unrelated measures
are being recommended here but it is not clear what they are.
These difﬁculties notwithstanding, the ﬁrst step was to develop
a base layer of topics relevant to patient safety. The starting
point for the base layer was the 37 recommendations published
in the UK document (Donaldson, 2007) as this was the largest
set of recommendations. By topics is meant one to ﬁve words
which describe the general issue addressed by the recommenda-
tion. For example, the UK’s Recommendation 2 led to a base
layer topic of “Stafﬁng” and their Recommendation 3 to “Train-
ing.” In establishing the initial base layer the problem immediately
encountered was that described above of two recommendations
being included in one numbered paragraph. Such a problem was
identiﬁed three times in the UK document (Donaldson, 2007).
As an example, Recommendation 5 included checking and inter-
ruptions so these were separated. Thus the initial base layer
expanded from the original published 37 topics to 40 topics. The
next largest group of recommendations (20) is in the H–H arti-
cle (Hendee and Herman, 2011). These were then mapped onto
the initial base layer of 40 topics as far as possible. Eleven of
the 20 H–H recommendations could not reasonably be mapped
onto the initial base layer derived from the UK recommenda-
tions (Donaldson, 2007). Thus, to accommodate these, the base
layer had to be expanded to 51 (40 + 11) topics. The inability
to map onto the UK document was, in this case, due, in part,
to several H–H recommendations being directed principally at
vendors about which the UK document had nothing to say. A
similar process was followed for the remaining ﬁve documents
(World Health Organization, 2007; Huq et al., 2008; International
Commission on Radiological Protection, 2010; American Soci-
ety for Radiation Oncology, 2012a; United States Government
of Veterans Affairs, 2012). The resulting base layer comprised
61 topics. Put another way, eliminating duplication between the
recommendations from the seven sources resulted in 61 unique
recommendations.
The “logic” involved in performing this mapping can be
illustrated with the example of Training, which was an initial
component of the base layer. Recommendation 2 of the UK doc-
ument (Donaldson, 2007) states that “Training records should be
created and maintained. . .and speciﬁc to particular procedures”
and “Funding to support training should be available.” ICRP 112
(International Commission on Radiological Protection, 2010), in
their second and third recommendations, refer to “a consistent
effort on education and training” and “Resources should be allo-
cated so as to avoid substituting proper training. . .” respectively.
These two ICRP recommendations also addressed training but
fromadifferent angle than theUK’sRecommendation 2. Theother
statements that were mapped on to “Training” in the base layer
were “Competency certiﬁcation” and “Staff competency assess-
ment” (World Health Organization, 2007); “Training/additional
study/analysis” (United States Government of Veterans Affairs,
2012); “free SAM module” and “educational content into ASTRO
meetings” (American Society for Radiation Oncology, 2012a);
“Patient safety should be a competency” (Hendee and Herman,
2011), and “Adequate training of staff” (Huq et al., 2008). Thus,
for this example, the conclusion is that all seven of the seven sets of
recommendations identify “Training,” interpreted as encompass-
ing education, as a general area which is particularly relevant to
patient safety.
RESULTS
The 12 initiatives cited in three or more of these sets of
recommendations are given in Table 1.
The twelve top recommendations are also listed here with
the number of citations in parentheses and the references to the
source documents in which the topic appears. In the next section
a brief commentary on each of the 12 initiatives is provided
Table 1 | Citations for the top twelve recommendations.
Recommendation TSF WHO ICRP NPSF ASTRO H–H TG100
Training
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Stafﬁng
√ √ √ √ √ √
Documentation/SOP
√ √ √ √ √
Incident learning
√ √ √ √ √
Communication/
√ √ √ √
questioning
Check lists
√ √ √ √
QC/PM
√ √ √ √
Dosimetric audit
√ √ √ √
Accreditation
√ √ √ √
Minimizing
interruptions
√ √ √
Prospective risk
assessment
√ √ √
Safety culture
√ √ √
TSF, Donaldson, 2007;WHO,World Health Organization, 2007; ICRP, International
Commission onRadiological Protection, 2010; NPSF, United StatesGovernment of
Veterans Affairs, 2012; ASTRO, American Society for Radiation Oncology, 2012a;
H–H, Hendee and Herman, 2011; TG100, Huq et al., 2008.
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as a basis for further discussion within the radiation treatment
community.
Training (7) (Donaldson, 2007; World Health Organization,
2007; Huq et al., 2008; International Commission on Radiological
Protection,2010; Hendee andHerman,2011;American Society for
RadiationOncology,2012a; United StatesGovernment ofVeterans
Affairs, 2012).
Stafﬁng/skills mix (6) (Donaldson, 2007; World Health Orga-
nization, 2007; Huq et al., 2008; International Commission on
Radiological Protection, 2010; Hendee and Herman, 2011; United
States Government of Veterans Affairs, 2012).
Documentation/standard operating procedures (5) (Donaldson,
2007; Huq et al., 2008; International Commission on Radiolog-
ical Protection, 2010; Hendee and Herman, 2011; United States
Government of Veterans Affairs, 2012).
Voluntary incident learning system (5) (Donaldson, 2007;World
Health Organization, 2007; International Commission on Radio-
logical Protection, 2010; Hendee and Herman, 2011; American
Society for Radiation Oncology, 2012a).
Communication/questioning (4) (Donaldson, 2007; Huq et al.,
2008; InternationalCommissiononRadiological Protection,2010;
Hendee and Herman, 2011).
Check lists – planners and prescribers (4) (Donaldson, 2007;
World Health Organization, 2007; Hendee and Herman, 2011;
United States Government of Veterans Affairs, 2012).
Quality control and preventive maintenance (4) (Donaldson,
2007; World Health Organization, 2007; Huq et al., 2008; Inter-
national Commission on Radiological Protection, 2010).
Dosimetric audit (4) (Donaldson, 2007; World Health Organi-
zation, 2007; International Commission on Radiological Protec-
tion, 2010; Hendee and Herman, 2011).
Accreditation (4) (Donaldson, 2007; World Health Organiza-
tion, 2007; Hendee and Herman, 2011; American Society for
Radiation Oncology, 2012a).
Minimizing interruptions (3) (Donaldson, 2007; Hendee and
Herman, 2011; United States Government of Veterans Affairs,
2012).
Prospective risk assessment (3) (Donaldson, 2007; Interna-
tional Commission on Radiological Protection, 2010; Hendee and
Herman, 2011).
Safety culture (3) (International Commission on Radiologi-
cal Protection, 2010; Hendee and Herman, 2011; United States
Government of Veterans Affairs, 2012).
COMMENTARY
TRAINING
Training, interpreted as including education for the purposes
of this study, is a recommended initiative in all seven of the
sources. However, it is not always clear what the training is in.
The UK document does recommend training in Quality Manage-
ment (Recommendation 33; Donaldson, 2007) but what exactly
does this mean? If we desire training to extend beyond education
to the development of a speciﬁc set of competencies which are
thoroughly assessed and a certiﬁcate issued then maybe the pro-
fessional organizations could play a more active and leading role.
On-linemodules are helpful in this regard (Williamson et al., 2011)
but, ideally, they will be supplemented with hands-on activities.
Events that incorporate an active component do take place to a
limited extent now such as contouring practica and institution
run practical workshops on particular technologies and clinical
processes. It is, of course, acknowledged that the vendors gener-
ally have well developed training programs run by experienced
instructors. However, these are obviously geared to the use of the
speciﬁc equipment which the particular vendor supplies. Perhaps
what is required to complement these events is more training in
speciﬁcally safety related topics, such as human factors, and in
process ﬂow, and related failure modes, as they apply to particular
processes in a particular clinic. A multidisciplinary approach to
such training might mitigate some of the communication difﬁcul-
ties encountered in a busy clinic environment. With practical help
from the professional organizations the structure and contents
of multidisciplinary specialty certiﬁcation/credentialing programs
could be developed (Brown et al., 2011). It is noteworthy that
Training is second from the bottom of the Hierarchy of Actions
(United States Government of Veterans Affairs, 2012).
STAFFING
The only set of recommendations not to mention stafﬁng is that
from ASTRO, their Target Safely initiative(American Society for
Radiation Oncology, 2012a). However, ASTRO has recently pro-
duced Safety Is No Accident (American Society for Radiation
Oncology, 2012b) in which stafﬁng is speciﬁcally addressed as a
signiﬁcant issue in the context of patient safety. An initiative in this
direction is thus actually supported by all seven sources included in
this analysis. Whether or not adequate stafﬁng levels are achieved
will depend on the willingness of radiotherapy providers to allo-
cate the necessary resources. They are much more likely to do so
now that a body such as ASTRO has provided them with up to
date stafﬁng recommendations and emphasized the relationship
between stafﬁng and patient safety.
DOCUMENTATION/STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
It is recognized that issues related to documentation/standard
operating procedures, their absence or inadequacy, are associated
with errors (Clark et al., 2012). Professional bodies, such as the
AAPM, have provided the community with a wealth of informa-
tion and data upon which to base clinic documentation. So why
do documentation related errors persist? One reason may be that,
while source documents related to the performance expectations
of the clinic’s infrastructure have been generated by the profes-
sional organizations, documentation of clinical processes, which
have to be developed largely locally, is lacking. A second possible
reason is that the development of adequate, comprehensive docu-
mentation requires the diversion of resources from other activities
and, perhaps, this activity has failed to rise to near the top of the
priority list of radiotherapy providers. However, it is a common
observation that even when adequate documentation does exist it
is not always followed. It is unlikely that failure to follow estab-
lished procedures is for some malicious reason. It is more likely to
be due to the procedure either having been forgotten or the sig-
niﬁcance of not following it not being fully appreciated. Perhaps
an FMEA type approach to ranking procedures according to the
potential consequences of non-adherence might be of help. For
clinical procedures there might be an opportunity for professional
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organizations and equipment suppliers to work together to iden-
tify those that are particularly safety critical. TG 100 is aiming to
make a contribution in this area (Huq et al., 2008). However, at
the end of the day it is really up to individual institutions to ensure
that they have adequate documentation of what they do and how
they do it.
INCIDENT LEARNING
The recent heightened interest in safety in radiotherapy has
brought to the fore recognition of the potential beneﬁts of track-
ing, analyzing, and sharing information on incidents. ROSIS was a
pioneer in this area (Cunningham et al., 2010). One of the original
architects of ROSIS recently moved on to the International Atomic
Energy Agency where he is currently leading the development of
an advanced multi-institution incident learning system, SAFRON
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012). Many institutions
are, in parallel, developing their own systems and it will be neces-
sary for all these systems to be able to share their databases in some
way if the community is to maximize learning opportunities. The
AAPM’s Working Group on the Prevention of Errors has an active
subgroup working which, at the time of writing, is concluding a
project on deﬁning the generic structure of an incident learning
system (Ford, 2012, personal communication). A useful discus-
sion of incident learning systems has been provided by Mutic and
Brame (2010).
COMMUNICATION/QUESTIONING
This topic found its way on to the base layer from the ﬁrst recom-
mendation in the UK document (Donaldson, 2007). Mapped on
to this topic were Time Outs (Hendee and Herman, 2011),“unam-
biguous,well structured communication”from the ICRP (Interna-
tional Commission on Radiological Protection, 2010), and “clear
lines of communication among staff” from TG 100 (Huq, 2012,
personal communication). Effective, open communication and
respectful questioning could both be regarded as key elements of
a well developed safety culture. Whilst professional organizations
can certainly emphasize the importance of these behaviors it is
up to the leaders of radiotherapy clinics to establish the environ-
ment in which communication and questioning are encouraged.
An interesting discussion, relevant particularly to the questioning
component of this topic, has been given by Low et al. (2010).
CHECK LISTS
In guarding against the propagation of errors resulting from inter-
ruptions, slips, and lapses, check lists clearly have a role. A well
known challenge in the use of check lists is automaticity where the
checker essentially does a “copy and paste” from the last ten check
lists he or she completed. Automating the checking procedure is
one way to at least partially overcome this difﬁculty through the
use of commercially available MU calculators or more institution
speciﬁc developments (Breen and Zhang, 2010). Inevitably there
will be a residual amount of hand checking that will have to be
done and, whilst not eliminating automaticity, emphasizing those
checks which are safety critical may mitigate its effects. The fruits
of TG 100’s labors (Huq et al., 2008), together with input from the
equipment suppliers, may help to highlight the most important
checks.
QUALITY CONTROL AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
The AAPM and other professional organizations have provided a
plethora of detailed recommendations particularly on the QC of
equipment. An opportunity to do more is the QC of processes.
TG 100 (Huq et al., 2008) is addressing this aspect of QC although
individual facilities will have to customize process QC to their
particular operational model.
DOSIMETRIC AUDIT
There can be little doubt that organizations like the RPC and
Equal-ESTRO have had, and continue to have, a huge positive
inﬂuence on the safety and quality of radiotherapy. Recent inci-
dents have, however, suggested that dosimetric audits are not
always carried out appropriately. The ﬁrst dosimetric audit should
take place prior to the ﬁrst clinical use of the device – obvious
but not always followed. And testing the device under conditions
other than those used to calibrate it could bring to light errors in
subsequent arithmeticmanipulations (CancercareOntario, 2012).
ACCREDITATION
Radiation Oncology speciﬁc accreditation has so far failed to gain
much support in North America (Tripuraneni et al., 2011). Using
web based technology the documentation review component of
accreditation could be made easier which may entice more insti-
tutions to participate. Failing that, stronger“inducements,” such as
regulations and tying re-imbursement to accreditation status, may
be necessary. Accreditation has proved its value in mammography
screening programs in re-assuring the client population of the
quality of the service provided. Why would we not adopt a similar
approach to restore conﬁdence in our ability to deliver high quality
and safe radiotherapy, particularly in view of the press coverage
we have received in recent years?
MINIMIZING INTERRUPTIONS
The issue of interruptions is familiar to all working in a busy
clinic. However, it is not always obvious how potentially danger-
ous interruptions can be when we are in the middle of a critical
task (Anthony et al., 2010). Check lists and no interruption zones
(Anthony et al., 2010) can be effective strategies in minimizing the
risks accompanying interruptions. Awareness of the risks can be
enhanced through educational activities organized by professional
bodies but it is more likely to be the local, institution led safety
culture that will determine whether or not staff members remain
respectful of other people’s space.
PROSPECTIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
This is the approach adopted by TG 100 (Huq et al., 2008) to the
rationalization of quality management activities in an environ-
ment of stable or diminishing resources and increasingly complex
workload. It clearly makes sense to take pre-emptive actions to
safeguard safety before introducing new technologies and pro-
cesses. However, doing so can require knowledge and skills that,
in most cases, were not developed during formal training. Pro-
fessional organizations, such as the AAPM, are doing their bit
to promote prospective safety measures (Huq et al., 2008) and
their efforts are reinforced by organizations such as the ICRP
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(International Commission on Radiological Protection, 2010).
However, yet again, whether or not prospective risk assess-
ment becomes part of our regular practice will depend upon the
commitment of employers and continued leadership within the
community.
SAFETY CULTURE
Many of the topics included in the base layer used for mapping
could have been mapped onto this topic but that would not have
been helpful for the present analysis. Professional organizations
have been explicitly or implicitly supporting the development of
a safety culture for many years. However, changing organizational
culture is one of the most difﬁcult things to do. What is required
is more than involvement from the top: true commitment is what
is required. In the context of patient safety, commitment will be
evidenced by allocating adequate resources to safety issues which
means going beyond the usual platitudes to which we have grown
immune.
DISCUSSION
Clearly “logic” only goes so far in performing this mapping exer-
cise – a signiﬁcant and variable element of judgment was also
employed depending on the recommendations being mapped.
The subjectivity in this communication is further evidenced in the
commentaries on each of the twelve top ranked initiatives which
are clearly based on the author’s opinions.
A second point related to the analysis is that, using the same
ﬂexibility in interpretation employed during the main mapping
process, some of the 37 recommendations (Donaldson, 2007) used
as the base layer topics could have been mapped onto each other.
For example, Recommendation 18, which addresses action levels
for in vivo dosimetry, would have been mapped onto Recommen-
dation 17, which addresses protocols for in vivo dosimetry, had
the former recommendation come from a different source. For
consistency it was decided not to map within the initial base layer
established from the UK document (Donaldson, 2007).
A question related to this analysis and the recommendations
upon which it based is whether or not there is any evidence
supporting the safety initiatives in any of the seven source doc-
uments and consequently whether or not they should be weighted
unequally. The only source document that comes close to basing
its recommendations on evidence is WHO’s Radiotherapy Risk
Proﬁle (World Health Organization, 2007). The authors of that
document have reviewed reports in the peer reviewed and gray
literature of actual events and near misses, performed, as best they
could, a Root Cause Analysis and deduced measures that, had they
been in place, would have reduced the probability of the event’s
occurring. The recommendations in the other six documents rep-
resent the consensus opinions of expert groups. There was no
justiﬁcation for weighting the recommendations in these various
documents other than equally.
The choice of which recommendations to include in this review
was the author’s. No systematic search of the literature was con-
ducted. However, it is believed that all major recent documents
with international inﬂuence have been included.
Whether it is implementing an incident learning system or
enhancing the safety culture within an organization, resources are
required. These may be new resources or resources diverted from
some other activity thus incurring an opportunity cost. However,
as well as debits on the quality/safety balance sheet there will likely
also be credits due to a more streamlined, efﬁcient operation and
improved staff morale amongst other beneﬁts. Although proba-
bly impossible to quantify, the beneﬁts of allocating additional
resources to safety/quality issues could well outweigh the costs.
CONCLUSION
The degree of success of any venture is determined by the qual-
ity of its leadership and the resources committed to that venture.
The venture for us, at this time, is making radiotherapy safer. As
pointed out above, leadership is apparent in several of the areas to
which the various recommendations converge with some commit-
ment of resources particularly by the professional organizations.
We can do better but we need to focus on those endeavors most
likely to be successful. This analysis has attempted to distill the
recommendations of many experts down to those initiatives most
likely to lead to our desired result – safer radiotherapy.
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